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Although  it  is common  practice  to refer  to the  goals,  rather
than  the  goal,  of  democracy,  probably democracy  has  only one
ultimate  goal-the  well-being  of  each  individual  as  a  distinct
and  significant  item  of  humanity.'  It  rests  upon  the  ancient
Christian-Jewish  belief that  each individual  human  being,  how-
ever mean his worldly status,  as  a  son of God has  a dignity and
worth  which is  equal to that of  every other  man.
ENDS  AND  MEANS  IN  DEMOCRATIC  THEORY
From this ultimate  democratic  goal  derive  a  series  of  prop-
ositions which have  led to  the establishment  of  democratic  sub-
goals  (or what might be described  as  the substantive  means for
achieving  the ultimate  goal)  and  also  to the  development  of  a
variety  of procedural  means for reaching  the ends  of the  demo-
cratic  state.  Just  as  the  economist  is  careful  to  distinguish  be-
tween  means  and  ends in  his  analyses,  so  the  political  scientist
must  also  make  this  nice  distinction.  Indeed,  in  the  political
complex  it  may  be  even  more  important  that  means  and  ends
do not become confused. For, whereas the essential end of democ-
racy-the well-being  of the individual-is ultimate  and change-
less  almost  in  the Platonic  sense,2 the means  for achieving  this
goal,  if  they  are  to  be  effective,  must  be  continuously  modified
to fit  a changing environment.  Thus,  a democratic  society must
have the capacity to distinguish between  ends and means if it is
to winnow  out and  retain from the  apparatuses  of  a democracy
those  elements  in its  structure  and  functioning which  are  essen-
tial  to the  preserving and strengthening  of a democratic  state.
1What  the well-being  of the  individual may  be composed  of  is,  of course,  a value
judgment.  But surely  it  cannot  be  defined  in  materialistic  terms  alone.  For  example,
the  right  of  an individual  to  participate  in  the  democratic  process,  as  a  part  of  the
expression  of his personality,  is probably  a factor  in  the  composition  of his  well-being.
The  American  concept  of the  well-being  of  the  individual  is  set forth  in  the  proposi-
tion  that  each  individual  is  entitled  to  "life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."
It  is  significant  that  Thomas  Jefferson  substituted  the  broader  sociological  concept
of  "pursuit  of  happiness"  for the  term  "property."  However,  both liberty  and pursuit
of  happiness  can  be  widely  interpreted.  In  a  democracy,  the  well-being  of  the
individual  is  subject  to  continuous  redefinition  by the  members  of  that society.
2That  is,  the  concept  of  well-being  is  changeless.  But,  as  stated  above,  the
definition  of well-being  in  a  truly  democratic  society will  change  with  changes  in  the
environment.  For  example,  with  an  expansion  in  a  society's  capacity  to  produce,
which  results  in  an  increase  in  national  per  capita  output,  men's  standards  for  ma-
terial  well-being  will  rise.
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Along with  the  democratic  concept  of  the  innate  worth  of
the  individual  go  other  propositions  concerning  the  means  by
which  a  democratic  society  is  to  be  achieved.  Some  of  these
propositions have become procedural  principles which seemingly
are  unchanging  necessities  in  the maintenance  of  a  democratic
state  and  must  be distinguished  from  mere  mechanical  devices
developed  for putting  these  principles  into  effect.
The first of these  propositions deriving from the innate worth
of  the  individual  is  that  he  is  intelligent.  It  is  a  belief  in  the
capacity  of  masses  of  men  to  govern  themselves.  Many  great
democrats,  such  as Thomas  Jefferson,  have  believed,  of  course,
that mass  education  was  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  an  intelli-
gent  electorate.  However,  the principle  of  the capacity  of  men
for self-government  is the first assumption  in a democratic  polit-
ical process.  A  second  proposition  has  been  that the best  guar-
antee  that  the  end  of  the  state  will  be  the  well-being  of  the
individual  citizen  is  some  form  of  popular  control  over  state
action. A final proposition  is that the well-being of the individual
can be  protected  only if, in addition  to popular control,  a dem-
ocratic  society  offers  certain  protections  against  the  state's  en-
croachment  upon the individual's  freedom to think and act.3
A  system  of  rights,  of  course,  assumes  the obligation  not to
impair  the rights  of others.  An  individual's  rights  must  be  bal-
anced  in terms  of  the  rights  of other  individuals.  As  Abraham
Lincoln  put  it,  the  Declaration  of  Independence  defines  with
"tolerable  clearness"  the equality  of status to which all men are
born.  It  is  an  equality  of  rights  before  the  law.  Not  only  is  a
system  of  rights  an  essential  in  protecting  a  man's  personality
as  an  individual,  but  it  is  also  an indispensable  factor  in  the
operation of  a democratic  process.  For  it is  in  the possession  of
the freedom  to think,  talk,  and act  that  a minority  has  the  op-
portunity  of making  itself  the majority.
MEANS  FOR  IMPLEMENTING  DEMOCRATIC  PRINCIPLES
The  procedural  means  that democratic  societies  have  devel-
oped for implementing  these basic principles of democracy range
3This  can  take  the  form  of  a bill  of  rights,  as  in  the  American  constitutional
system.  Or, as  in  the  British  system  where  the  power  of  the  majority  is  theoretically
unlimited,  it  can  take  the  form  of  unwritten  social  sanctions,  which  seemingly  are
sometimes  stronger protections  than  constitutional  guarantees.
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ciples  of democratic  government,  to those  which  are  little more
than  mechanical  apparatuses.  Too  frequently  these  apparatuses
have been mistakenly considered  as ends in themselves,  whereas,
in truth, in a changing economy with its shifting social structures,
they  may well  thwart  the real  ends  of democratic  society.
One of the  mechanical  devices  of democracy which  thus far
has  proved  so  indispensable  that it  perhaps  should  be  classified
as a principle  of democracy  is  that of government  through  pop-
ular  representation.  Only  in  the  smallest  of  political  societies
can  a  direct  democracy  function.  Even  the  Greek  city  states,
small  as  they  were  and excluding  as they  did large  segments  of
their  population  (the  slaves)  from  citizenship,  could  not  make
direct  democracy  function  effectively.  Although the Roman  Re-
public  and even the government  of the Caesars  was based upon
the  concept  of popular  sovereignty,  men had not developed  the
concept  of  popular  control  through  representation.  It  was  not
until the emergence  of parliaments  in the  twelfth and  thirteenth
centuries that the apparatus  of government  through elected  rep-
resentatives  accountable  to  their  constituencies  began  slowly
to develop. Today representation  is an essential in the democratic
process.
The  mechanisms  for  achieving  representation  are  clearly  in
the  nature  of  apparatuses  which  should  be  subject  to  change
with  changing  needs and  circumstances.  Thus,  the geographical
bases  for  representation,  now  common  to all  democratic  states,
are  not  an  immutable  part  of  representative  government.  For
example,  good  cases  have  been  made  by  democratic  theorists
for  representation  according  to the  major interest  groupings  in
society.
Another  series  of  democratic  conventions  has  grown  up
around the problem of consent.  How is the democratic  principle
of consent  of the  governed  to be carried  into practice?  The  first
part of  the problem  of consent  is:  How  is  consent  to  be  meas-
ured?  Majority  rule  has  been  the  solution  developed.  Indeed,
majority  rule, in the  eyes  of many,  has become  an  end  in itself.
Yet there is nothing mystical  about the figure of 51  percent. Are
the  51  percent  always  right,  and  the 49  percent  always  wrong?
Why should  the 51  percent  have  a right  to impose  its will  upon
the  49  percent?
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developed  for  measuring  the  "will  of  the  community,"  which
has been so important in democratic  theory since medieval times.
It is  little more  than a  convenience  and has  no  sanctity  in  and
of itself.  Its great  value  lies in the fact  that, until  now at  least,
men  have  found  no  better  method  for making  popular  control
and  representation  work;
The  second part of the problem of consent is  the question of
the nature of the decisions which the individual is to make in the
political  process.  What  form is  the individual's  participation  in
government to take? To what is the citizen  to consent?  The pop-
ular election  of those  who  are  to manage  the  state  is  the  great
consent  citizens  in  a representative  democracy  give.  But  should
citizen  consent,  citizen  decisions  in  the  political process,  be  lim-
ited to the periodical election of representatives?  Or does modern
democracy  call  for  new  forms  of  citizen  participation?  For ex-
ample,  the Progressive movement  of the early twentieth  century
brought  into  operation  new  devices  for  more  direct  democracy
such as the initiative, the referendum,  and the recall. With mod-
ern  government  stepping  even  further  into  the  economic  lives
of its citizens,  new forms of participation  in the building of gov-
ernmental  programs  may  prove  of  value.  The  old  Land  Use
Planning Program, the Soil Conservation  Districts, and the local
farmer  committee  systems  set  up  by  extension  services,  PMA,
FHA,  and  REA  are  experiments  in  this  form  of  functional
democracy.
Perhaps  the democratic  convention  around  which  the  most
unpleasant  connotations  have  gathered  is  that of  the procedure
of compromise.  Yet compromise  is an essential  process in a  dem-
ocratic society. When compromise  is not possible,  the democratic
process breaks down as  it did in the  1860's with  a  Civil War re-
sulting. The legislatures  and the courts are built for working out
acceptable  social  compromises.  The  President,  in  the American
system  is  the  great  compromiser.  More  properly  he  should  be
described  as the great integrator.  As  a representative  of  all  the
people,  he  must weigh  and balance  conflicting  social  claims  and
integrate them  in the wisest  public policy proposals  possible.  At
its  best,  then,  democratic  compromise  is  an integrating  process
which  prevents  the  centrifugal  forces  in  society  from  tearing
society apart and which works out  the wisest  adjustments of in-
terests  which  are  socially  and  politically  acceptable.
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ican democracy which derive from the priceless democratic  prin-
ciple  that  the  individual  possesses  a  body  of  rights  which  are
inviolate  from state action.  The  first of  these  apparatuses  is  the
concept of limited government.  In the fear that government can-
not be  popularly controlled  and  also  as a protection  against  the
excesses of the majority,  the sphere  of governmental  authority is
to  be limited.
The belief that government  can,  in democratic  propriety,  be
limited grows  out of the  old  social contract  theory,  according  to
which  men  possessed  rights  in  a  "state  of  nature"  before  they
entered  into a political compact  to create a  state.  Thus men  are
entitled  to reserve  certain rights,  certain areas  of activities,  over
which  the state  has  no  control.  In  the American  constitutional
system,  some  of these  basic  rights  are set  forth in  the  first eight
amendments.
That  a narrow  concept  of limited  government  is not  always
necessary  for  the protection  of individual  freedoms is  testified  to
by the British system where the government's  sphere  of  action is
theoretically  unlimited.  Moreover,  when the concept of a limited
government  is  held  up  as  an end  of  democratic  society,  it may
actually  thwart  the  true  ends  of  democracy.  Thus,  pre-1937
Supreme  Court  decisions  in  the  fields  of  labor,  social  security,
and agriculture,  which turned  on a  belief  in the sharply  limited
power of the federal  government,  not only were  thwarting  pop-
ular  will  on  what  a  democratic  government  should  do  for  its
citizens,  but also  (and of  course,  this  is  a  value  judgment)  they
were  preventing  the  true  end  of  democracy-that  of  the  well-
being  of the individual-from  being served.
Another outgrowth  from the  belief  that democracy  calls  for
mechanical limitations on the powers of government  is the devel-
opment of certain formulas  for dispersing  the powers of govern-
ment.  The  federal  system  and  the separation  of  powers  among
the  three  branches  of  the  national  government  are  sometimes
held  up as  essential  ends  in a  democratic  state.  Yet  they are  no
more  than  devices for  preventing  the consolidation  of  power  in
the hands of one level or branch of government.  Neither a unitary
nor  a  parliamentary-cabinet  system  of  government  means  dic-
tatorship.  Many democratic  political  scientists  contend  that  the
British  unitary and  parliamentary  system  is  more  responsive  to
popular  will than  is the American  system.
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legislature,  and a supreme  court,  designed  in a day when it was
believed that the individual's welfare was best promoted  by state
inaction,  multiplies  the  opportunities  for  preventing  the  state
from  taking  action  which  modern  democratic  society  may  de-
mand.  In  like  fashion,  federalism  is  not  an  indispensible  cog  in
democracy.  Repeatedly  in recent history,  the states'  rights  argu-
ment  has  been  advanced  to  prevent  the  national  government's
acting  to  protect  or promote  the  well-being  of  groups  of'indi-
viduals.  Frequently  the paramountcy  of state responsibility  in  a
given  field of social  action  is  claimed  merely  as  a means  of cir-
cumventing  all  government  action.  For many modern  problems
are  beyond  the  capacity  of  the states  to  solve  because  of  their
geographical  scope,  their  cost,  or because  of  political  obstacles
present  within a  state.
The glorification of local government as an end of democracy
sometimes  also  has  the  aim  of  limiting  the  action  of  both  the
national and state governments. Although local government offers
more mechanical  opportunities  for  fuller citizen  participation  in
government,  local  government  can  be  oligarchical  government
and less  responsive  to the will  of the community than is national
or  state  government.  The  changing  nature  of  time-space  rela-
tionships  means  that  the  citizen  can  now  keep  in  closer  touch
with the workings  of his national government  than he often does
with that of his town or county government.
In short,  there  are  certain  democratic  procedural  principles
for  achieving  the  end  of democratic  society-the  well-being  of
the individual-which  are  almost changeless.  These are popular
control  of government  or government  through  popular  consent,
the  protection  of  minority  thinking,  and  government  through
representation.  The  means  for  implementing  these  principles,
however,  need  not  remain  fixed  and  changeless.  They  are  not
immutable  and inviolate.  Indeed  the keystone  in a  truly demo-
cratic process is change.  Procedures,  if they are  to serve the ulti-
mate goal of democracy,  must be modified to meet the changing
needs  of  the environment  from  which  government  springs.
CHANGING  NATURE  OF  SUBSTANTIVE  MEANS  OR  SUBGOALS
Nor is change merely the keynote for the processes of democ-
racy. It is also the key to defining  the substantive means,  or pro-
grams,  by which the ultimate  goal of the democratic  state-the
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factors which comprise  the welfare  of the  individual are  largely
value  judgments,  no  one  student  can  undertake  to  define  the
nature of individual welfare  or to  set forth what  the subgoals  or
programs  for  achieving  this state  of welfare  should be.
However,  an  historical  examination  of  the  policies  of  the
American  national  government  reveals  how  public  goals  have
shifted  and  changed  in  response  to  an  environment  which,
through  the throes of vast technological  change,  has become  in-
dustrialized and urbanized and has tied groups scattered through-
out  the nation  into  close  patterns  of  interdependence.  Early  in
American  history  it was  commonly  held  by democratic  theorists
that the well-being of the individual could best be served through
a  laissez-faire  state  which  did  not  enter  the  economic  arena.
Jefferson's famous statement that government which governs best
is the one which governs least typifies  this view of the end of the
democratic  state.
Later in the nineteenth  century,  however,  men began  to  feel
that the  individual's  well-being  could  best  be  promoted  by gov-
ernment's  stepping  into  the economic  arena  to hold  the  ring,  to
regulate and control the rules of the economic  game in the inter-
est of fair play.  Thus it became the goal-or rather subgoal,  ac-
cording  to  the  terminology  used  here-of  the  democratic  state
to eliminate  monopoly  and re-establish  free  competition,  to pro-
tect the  weak against the strong in the economic  struggle.  These
goals  of  democracy  emerged  in the  "Square  Deal"  program  of
Theodore  Roosevelt  and the "New  Freedom"  of Woodrow  Wil-
son.  Indeed  the  name  of  the  Wilsonian  program  for  domestic
reform  reflects  the  theory  that an  individual's  true freedom  can
only be  re-established  by government's  acting  in a  positive  way
to  guarantee  that freedom.
Still  later,  it was  the  democratic  verdict  that  government  to
promote the well-being of its citizens must do more than regulate
in the  interest of fair play.  It must establish  a  series  of subgoals
or  programs  for  providing  positive  assistance  to  individuals  in
meeting  the hazards  of  the new  urban,  industrial  environment.
The public goals  which American  democracy has  established
to promote  the  well-being  of its citizens  in  agriculture  generally
follow  the  same  historical  pattern  from  laissez-faire  to  positive
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ence  and  individualism  of  the  American  farmer,  the  agrarian
group, perhaps more than any other economic  group, has always
seen  government  as  an  agent  for  promoting  its  well-being  in  a
positive  fashion.
Although the distribution  of the public domain  to those who
wished  to  establish  farms  either  at  a  cheap  price  or  on  a  free
homestead  basis was  an  act of positive  governmental  assistance,
such  a parceling  out of land was held,  even  in early  days,  to  be
compatible  with  the  ends  of the democratic  state.  For a nation
of freeholders,  owning land in small parcels was  seen as the basis
for a vigorous  democracy.  This  concept  is  basic today  in public
goals  for  maintaining  and  strengthening  the  family-size  farm.
Long  before  the  Civil  War,  farmers,  frontiersmen  though  they
were, were  pressing  the government  to provide  the internal  im-
provements  in the West which would  give them ready  access  to
their lands.  They sought  government  intervention  to break  the
hold of eastern capitalists on the money they needed to build  the
West.  They wanted  government to act to get them cheap  credit
and  cheap  money.
With the  Civil War,  were established  those  two public insti-
tutions-the  USDA and the land-grant colleges-which  were  to
give the farmer the positive assistance of new scientific knowledge
which was to promote his welfare by making him a more efficient
producer.
Even before  the opening  of  the twentieth  century,  however,
agrarian  groups  were  recognizing  that  scientific  knowledge  of
production  methods was  not enough  to secure  the farmer's  wel-
fare.  The new  commercial  agriculture,  which  changing  agricul-
tural  technology,  industrialization,  urbanization,  and new  modes
of transportation  were producing, was becoming dependent upon
a  market  and  transportation  system  over  which  the  individual
farmer had no control. Thus,  such agrarian movements  as  those
of the Grangers  and Populists saw it as compatible with the goals
of democracy  for government to step  in  and regulate the  trans-
portation  monopoly  in  the  interest  of  fair  treatment  for  the
farmer.  The  inspection  and  control  over  the  transportation  of
livestock  in  the interest  of  protecting  the  farmer's  markets  was
also seen  as a legitimate subgoal  of democracy.
119The  growing  economic  instability  of  commercial  agriculture
and the growing poverty of those farm groups which did not have
the resources  to commercialize  were  climaxed by the twin catas-
trophes of depression and drouth. These dramatic  events focused
the attention of American democracy on the need for developing
public agricultural goals which called for even more positive gov-
ernmental  assistance  in  promoting  the  well-being  of  citizens  in
agriculture.  Thus, it became  a  subgoal of  American  democracy
to underwrite  for farmers  a minimum opportunity  for  obtaining
some minimum level of living. Such a goal is compatible with the
now  generally  accepted  belief  that  a democratic  state,  to carry
out its responsibility for its citizens'  well-being,  must take positive
steps  to underwrite  a minimum  level  of welfare.  But  the  demo-
cratic principle  of "equality  of rights"  is  basic in measuring  the
democratic  justification  or  programs  for  underwriting  a  mini-
mum level  of living  in  agriculture.  An  individual  citizen's  right
to the opportunity  of obtaining a minimum level of living implies
an equitable  distribution  of this right  among  all citizens.  It  im-
plies that such a right is not to be given to one individual or group
of individuals  at the  expense  of the welfare  of other  individuals
and groups.  In short,  it implies a balancing  of the needs  and in-
terests  of individuals,  groups,  and  the  public.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion,  then,  it should be re-emphasized  that  democ-
racy  is  a  humanitarian  philosophy.  As  such,  it  has  content.
Democracy  is  not  just  a  procedure,  or  a  group  of  procedures,
such  as majority  rule.  As  a  philosophy,  democracy  has  an  ulti-
mate changeless goal. But the element of flexibility is always pres-
ent in society's definition  and redefinition of the subgoals in order
to  bring  them  into  closer  harmony  with  shifting  environmental
circumstances  and changing  needs  of the individual.
Democracy  also  has certain  high-level  principles  which may
be  changeless.  The  American  political  process  involves  many
mechanical  devices  for  implementing  these  principles  which,
through  traditional  association,  we  may  come  to  consider  as
democracy  itself.  But  such mechanical  apparatuses  as a  federal
system,  a  two-house  legislature,  a  separation  of  powers  scheme
are  all simply means chosen  from among several  alternatives  for
achieving democratic ends. As means, they have no inherent sanc-
tity and must always be subjected to the pragmatic test of utility.
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promise  for  achieving  democratic  goals  and  subgoals,  it  is  not
only  permissible  but  mandatory,  under  the  democratic  theory,
that  the alternative  devices be adopted  in order that  the end of
democracy-the  well-being  of  the individual-be  better  served.
We  have  attempted  to  dissect  and  analyze  the  democratic
theory in the belief that this sort of knowledge  is not just academic
or extraneous to the interests of the worker in agricultural  policy.
The student working with agricultural policy needs to understand
the limits and the leeways  of the democratic  theory,  so  that, on
the  one  hand,  his  analyses  and suggestions  will not violate  the
essential  elements  of  democracy,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  they
will not  be inhibited  by his fear of  suggesting  changes  in  tradi-
tional political institutions and procedures which are not essential
to  democracy  and which  are,  therefore,  entirely  susceptible  of
change.
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